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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
BEEHIVE SE:CURITY THRIFT & LOAN, 
a U tab corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN T. HYDE and IviARY C. HYDE, his 
wife, KERMIT R. ESKELSEN, LARSON 
PAINTING COMPANY, and UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
NO. 10232 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS JOHN T·. HYDE, 
MARY C. HYDE and KERMIT R. ESKELSEN 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree with the Statement of Facts 
set forth in Appellant's brief, and for that reason Re-
spondents make no separate statement of facts. 
For the purpose of argument, Respondents will 
consolidate their answers to Points I and II of Ap-
pellant's brief under Point I of Respondents' brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING 
THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE SUED UPON IS 
USURIO·US 
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The-trial court, in its Conclusions of Law, concluded 
as follows: 
"2. That the note sued upon is usurious and that 
interest may not be charged by an industrial loan 
company on a loan in excess of $5,000.00.'' 
Section 15-l-2, Utah Code Annotated/ 19531 as it 
applies to this case provides as follows: 
"The parties to any contract may agree in writing 
for the payment of interest for the loan or forebear-
ance of any money, goods or things in .action, not to 
exceed ten per cent per annum; provided: 
(a) That a loan or any renewal thereof except a 
loan made under subsection (g) may specifically pro-
vide for a service charge, which charge shall not ex-
ceed four per cent of the principal sum of said loan; 
such service charge shall not be subject to any ad-
ditional charge or interest; 
* * * 
(f) that industrial loan corporations may contract 
for and receive interest and charges at the rates sub-
ject to the limitations contained in chapter 8, Title 
7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; 
(g) that any corporation, except small loan licensees, 
operating under the supervision of the state banking 
department of Uta;h, and any national bank or fed-
eral savings and loan association doing business in 
the state may add to or deduct in advance from the 
proceeds of any loan repayable in installments over 
a period of not more than 63 months and not exceed-
ing $5,000.00 in principal amount, interest or dis-
count at a rate not ·exce·eding seven per cent per an-
num upon the principal amount of the loan for the 
en tire period thereof; provided, however, such 
amount added on or discounted shall be computed 
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in accordance with rate· charges yielding the lender 
interest which shall not exceed 14% per annum ... " 
(Emphasis added.) . 
. . ' I 
It should be noted that Section 15-1-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, attempts to provide a comprehen-
sive schedule of maximum rates that may be charged 
as interest with respect to ariy.loan under any cir-
cumstances. However, it should also be noted that 
the permissible interest rates vary, depending on 
the amount loaned and the identity of the lender. 
Thus, the statute permits anyone to charge up to ten 
per cent per annum as interest, and it also contains 
provisions which apply to industrial loan corpora-
tions, and other corporations supervised by the state 
banking department. 
Appellant in its brief asserts that the rate appli-
cable to this transaction is subsection (f), which ap-
plies to industrial loan corporations. Respondents 
submit however, that whether the lender is an indus-
trial loan corporation or not, is a question of fact. 
· Respondents respectfully submit that there is 
no allegatlon in plaintiff's complaint, nor is there any 
admission on the part of the defendants, offer of 
proof by the Appella_nt, or any finding by the trial 
court, that the Appellant is an industrial· loan cor-
poration. Accordingly, the maximum interest rate al-
lovrable would have been ten per cent per annum. 
Since the note in question provided for an interest 
rate in excess of nineteen per cent (19%) per annum, 
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the .trial court' was justified ··iri::·1incllng .. that the) not~; 
was usurious. ·On ·this. :.·<Jroun?. ala~-~ the: trial court 
should be sustained. ..~,/./;:c·.. ..': · ·' 
. ~ :.~- '. ~- : ' y-.. •• ~ ... , _,·-~- . • . . . _·· ,-.•. -~.. ..:. ~ :; ~ .. ·-.. . . -
H6wever,·· e-~e!l-'if Appellant were an. industrial 
loan corporation (which Respondents do not admit)/ 
the trial court was still_correct in concluding t}J.at the 
note sued up<)!{ Was. usurib.{;_~~- .. : --~ : -. · . . . -
Appellant takes great exception ·to that part of 
the· Conclusions ·of Law,· which· states that interest 
may not be charged by_ an industrial loan company 
in excess of $5,000.00. ·Respondents believe that this 
statement was inserted in the· Conclusions of Lavr 
by Appellant as a straw-man._type issue. Respondents 
have never contended that an industrial loan com-
pany cannot charge interest on a loan in excess of 
$5,000.00. Thi3 real question involved here is: What 
interest rate may be charged 'by an industrial loan 
company,. or anyone else, on a loan ,in excess of 
$5,000.00? . ·~ 
. -~~~~~~ · .. · :·~:s~.~-~~ ... :·:. 
Appellant in its brief lays great emph~sis on-·an. 
. . . ·- . ~ ~ ~ . -; ~ -
opinion of, th~ Attorney Ge:qerql; but Appellanl has 
cited only part of the opinion .. Ihei~~{:qf't4~e. ~pini6r1' 
discloses that the Attorney. General's. ·opinion was 
in response. to ·the q~esUon: ''Are. 'irt~dustrial loan 
corporatiqns limited to loans of$-S,OQO.OO -rtiaxir,rium?'.' 
.. Th~ rea~ substance· of the· opinion of the Attorney 
Gene·ral was that Sectiorts 15-1~2 and 7~-8-3, Utcili.Code 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
Annotated, 1953, do not constitute a limitation o .1 the 
maximum amount wh,ich may be loaned by an in-
dustrial loan corporation . 
. Section 7-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides: ·· · · · 
"Every industrial loan corporation shall have power: 
(b) To charge interest for the full term of the loan 
computed on the original amount of the loan (ex-
cluding charges) at the rate of l <J'o or less per month 
on that part of the lo.an not in excess of $2,000.00 and 
at the rate of 3/4 of l<J'o per month or less on that part 
of the -loan in excess of $2,000.00, but not in excess 
of $5,000.00, without regard to any requirement for 
installment payments (subject to the refund for re-
payment in full as set forth in paragraph d)." 
The words/ ''every industrial loan corporation 
shall have power" (emphasis ·ours) a p p are n t 1 y 
caused the Utah State Banking Commissioner to 
wonder whether an industrial loan corporation 
could make a loan in excess of $5/000.00; hence the 
request for the Attorney General's opinion. The At-
torney General, however, reasoned that these words 
should not be construed as a limitation on the 
amount of money that an industrial loan corporation 
could loan. Respondents. agree with this reasoning 
up to this point. The Attorney General, however/ 
went further and reasoned that an industrial loan 
corporation could charge the maximum rates speci-
fied in Section 7-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953/ on 
amounts up to $5,000.00, and in addition thereto 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
could charge 10% per :.a-nnum: pursuant to Sectioii 
15-l-2, Utah Cod·e'-:Annotated}-1953, on ·all amounts 
in ·excess of $5,000.00. ·R·esp.ondents respectfully dis:. 
agree .with this ~part of the Attorney General's opin~ 
io.n. To allow such· a result would mean that-an in~ 
dustrialJoan corporation· making a·loan in exce·ss :of 
$5,000.00. would :be· governed under Section--7~8-3, 
Utah- Code .. Annotated, 1953~ as to · patt ·of the ·loah, 
and under. Section 15-1~2;: Utah· CodEr Arinot.ated., 
1953, :9-s to .the remainder of the loan~ Furthermore~ 
there.:vvo.uld,be no· apparent prohibition on charging 
the··four .. per cent service charge allowed by subsec-
tion (a) of Section 15-1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
It ts clear that the statutes cited do provide max-
imum rates of interest that-may be charged, and that 
Section 15~1-2 (g) at least does not apply to this case,. 
because by its ·express terms it is limited to loans 
not·exceeding-$5,000.00. Respondents further submit 
that ··Section::· 15-1-2 (f), {which refers ·to Section 
7-8-3, Utah Code Annotated~ 1'9,53) does not apply to 
this transaction because it·rriakes··no··a.liowance- for 
·cny interest to be charged on' ahy--loan=-in excess 'of 
·SS.,OOO~OO. · - .~.)~1 .. :. ·tri ~: ~, :··.:· 
....... , /·· ........ . 
.. ,,,.' 
. Respondentp submit that better reasoning would 
ii1dicate that_ Sectiqn 15-·1~2,·· Utah Code Annotated; 
:1953, .. -~nd Settio~ 778-3,· ·utah code Annotat~d-, !'953, 
o.r2 intended to p1'ovide_l5for' ·:alternative rate~ rather 
··tha·n supplementary· rates, and th·at unless a lender 
- .. / 
can bring his loan entirely Within the-· provisions of 
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Section 7-8-3, relating_to the, alternative rate, the maxF 
rnum rate applicable to his -loan ·should be- the s~me 
rate- which applies. to anyone else's who doesn't 
qualify for alternativ~ rates; _that is,· that the m~ximum 
rate on the entire loan .. is 10% per' annum~ Thus, Re-
spoii:¢ents submit that these. provisions, 'taken as a 
whole,_ do not prohibit an industrial loan -corporation 
or._anyone else from making a 1oan in excess of _$5,-
000.00; but the statute· does prohibit anyone, includ-
ing industrial loan corporations, from charging more 
than 10% per annum as interest ·for· the en.tire 
amount of any loan if th·e loan exceeds the sum of 
$5,000.00 . 
. In the instant transaction, Beehive Security_ Thrift 
& Loan made a loan to the _Hydes in: t4e amount of 
$5,504.71 and charged inte-rest thereon in the amount 
of $1,603.29 as add-on interest which constitutes an 
interest rate in excess of 19% per annum. Conse-
quently, Respondents submit that the trial court was 
cl~arly co~ect in holp.ing th~t _the note sued upon i3 
~surious. Respondents _s"t+bmit that that -part of _the 
Conclusions of Law >No. 2_which states, "that interest 
may not be charged by an industrial loan company 
on a loan in excess of $5,000.00" is not really critical 
to the decision; and pursuant to Rule 61, ·Utah· 'Rules 
of CiyilProcequre,·if such a ruling constitutes error 
it is only harmless. error and does. not constitute •?. 
ground .for disturbi.n~- the judgment, and. should .be 
disregard~d by this Honorabl~ Court. · . . . .. . . 
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POINT· \II. THE .STATUTORY TIIVJ~ FOR THE RE-
C:QVERY."·· . OF . US·URJO-US INTEREST HAD NOT. 
LAPs·E.n so A,S To :BAR, REsl>"oNDENT'S' co:uNTER-
CLAIM ' .. 
· ·section· iS-l-7,· Utah Code :Artnotated, 1953, pro-
vides that 'th~- t~erson by:· whom a gtea.ter rate of iri- . 
terest ha·s been paid :··:may· tecover back three times · 
the:'amount .. of interest thus paid·, together-with reas-
onable~ attorney's feE§s;·_ '-'provided ·th·at such action is 
commenced 'Witbi:n:·.two ye·ars ·from the time the· 
u:stirious transaction occurred.''. 
-·The record-· 'Shows. ·that the subject transaction 
occurred on·April18,·1961. The record further shows 
that within two years thereafter (on approximately 
F~brua~y 13, 1963) plaintiff commenced this action, 
which was ··based upon .. ·the same transaction. Re-
spondents concede that defendants Hyde filed their 
ar1:swer setting forth a claim for setoff by reason of 
usu'rious transactio_n- in:ore'~: than·· tw.o ·years after the 
transaction occurred; howe~er,:-respondents submit 
that ·this· does ;not· bar defendants Hyde from assert-
ing the defense of usury by·way of setoff a~d of ob-
taining the benefit of the full relief allowed by the 
U$,Ury $tq.tu~e. . · · · .. · . ,._: , , 
... In t:he _case c;>f Tom Reed Gold Mines Co. v. 
Brady, 99 P.2d 97-(Ariz. 1940) the Supreme Court of 
A:r:i~0na dec{qed th~t if a counte~claim or .setoff is not 
b.~rJ-_e·d by the St~tut~ .of Li~itations at the.commence-. 
m"ellt ofthe action in ~hi~h 'it is pleaded, it does not 
. . ' 
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bec6rrie 'so ~durin'c;r tne pende:hcy·~'of •'that action, al-.-
thoug4 the. stat'-ltdrY. periQd_··nlay-~ pave elapsed be-
fore the filing of the answer-setting it up. :'r' 
... Jn~the case. of Whittier· v. -Ylssch~r,: 189,Cc:Ll· 450, 
209 Pac. 23, the Supreme. Court ofCal~f9rni~ l:J.<?ld. that 
the~ authorities were ,agre?d J4at -if, a right of action 
relied on as a counterclaiffi--·w~s .. a,live·.:at. ~e -~om.~ 
mencement of the suit the Statute of Limitations does .. 
not ru~ against it, even ~thougl}.the fuli st~tl1ior)r.pe~-­
riod expires during the--pendency of the. acti~n _and_. 
before the counterclaim is pleaded by filing the 
counterclaim. (See also, to. the same effect: .. Union 
Sugar Company v. Hollister Estate, 3 Cal. 2d.740, 47_· 
P.2d 273-1935.) · ·· · 
In the case of Zink v •. Zink, 5.6 Ind. App. 677, 106 
N.E. 381 (1914) the Court said: .. 
"A defendant_ may set up in a c_~oss-compl.a~nt a cause 
of action which was· not- barred by· the Statute of 
Limitations at ·th·e time the ·:plclintiff~s action was 
. _filedj and such cause of action cannot -become barred 
!J • • ' • .. ' ' • • _·, ~ 
. by .tpe s~~tute during. t~e p_en.dency,:of the plaintiff's 
action." _· _ ·' , · '-. · ,_ 
In the case of Denton v. Detweiler, 48 Ida. ·369, 
282 P~~· 82 (1929)~ the Su:preme _Court of Idah.o st9.ted 
the general rule t''to be that: "The defense of the 
Statute ~f Limitations is rt~t av~il~ble· againsf;a ooun~~ 
terclaim durfng the pendency . of the . action unless 
the claim was barred when :''the a!ctiori was cdm~ ~ 
menced." 
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. In .Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 55 S.Ct. 695, 
79 -L.~d- 1421 it -~a9 _held t.hat although the Statute of 
Limitations ·barred. the recovery back of a Federal 
Estate. :rax erroneously assessed and paid, on the 
theory that certain moneys receive'd by the execu-
tor- ·;of ·the ·d·ecedent' s estate was part of the corpus 
of. the .estate··, ·.th·e estate ···was entitled··to have the 
amount so paid credited on an income tax subse-
qu~ntly assessed in respect ·-of such moneys; and that 
where the claim for refund was not barred at the time 
the· Government proceeded against the Executor for 
the collection of the income tax, such claim could be 
asserted by. way of ·setoft although the statutory pe-
riod had run before the attempt to do so was made. 
: No recent cases were found with respect to this 
matter, but respondents believe that this is because 
the precedents are so well established that there is 
practically no other view. ·The precedence is so 
qncient that we h~ve .even found one English case 
decided in 1797, which holds this view. See Ord v. 
Ruspini, 170 Eng" Reprint 458. in which it was held 
that where · there · were· cross demands between 
plaintiff and defendant which accrued at the same 
.~irne,_and both of which~wov-ld have been barred by 
the Statute of Limitations .had not the plaintiff saved 
the status· of his demand by commencing an action, 
-. . 
the defendant might set off his demand even though 
he did not file his answer unfil after the statutorv 
. J, 
time would have run. 
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As applied to thi~ caser it wo1-1ld seem· therefore 
that by .way of offset defendants Hyde ~re_~ntitled 
to the relief allowed .under the. Usury _Statute, by_ 
reason of the fact that the. ;plaintiff's compla~n~ was 
filed within two years of the time the usurious trans.-
action occurred, even .. though ~aid._ answer. was not. 
filed until after the. two years had passecf ·. 
CONCLUSION 
. •. 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respect-
fully submit that the trial cou~t did not err in holding; 
and finding that the note. sued upon is usurious and 
that Respondents are entitled to the credits and off-: 
sets which were allowed by the trial court, by reason 
of which this Honorable· Court should sustain the 
judgment of the trial court. · 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. REED TUFT 
53 East Fourth :S·outh 
Salt Lake City,.·Utah · 
Attorney for Respondents John T.· 
Hyde and Mary C. Hyde 
JOHN G. MARSHALL 
53 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake- City, Utah 
Attorpey for Respondent Kermit R. 
Eskelsen ·· 
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